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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF 
ADJUSTMENT, GLENN B. SMITH, 
MARIANNE M. SMITH, W. GREG 
BUTTARS, and LESLIE E. BUTTARS, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 940014-CA 
Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant 
to §78-2a-3(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or 
appeals from the district court review of informal 
adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax 
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of 
political subdivisions of the state or 
other local agencies;.... 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
The following issue is presented for review: 
1. Was the Utah County Board of Adjustment's decision to 
grant Appellants1 request for constructing a private airport 
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adequately supported by substantial evidence. 
The standard of review is set out in U.C.A. §§17-27-708(2), 
(6) (1953, as amended): 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the 
board of adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, 
or illegal. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of 
adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. (emphasis added) 
The Utah Court of Appeals should affirm the Utah County Board 
of Adjustment's decision granting Appellants1 application if it 
finds that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's 
decision. "Substantial evidence" is such relevant evidence as/ a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1989). 
In an appeal from the District Court's judgment after review 
of the administrative agency's decision, the Court of Appeals 
reviews the decision as if the appeal had come directly from the 
agency and there is no presumption of correctness of the District 
Court decision, since its review is no more advantageous than that 
of the Court of Appeals. Kline Bv and Through Kline v. Utah Dept. 
of Health. 776 P.2d 57, at 60 (Ut. Ct. App 1989). See also Vali 
Convalescent and Care Institutions v. Division of Health Care 
Financing, 797 P.2d 438 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990); Matter of License of 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied 773 P.2d 45 
(1989); Weber Memorial Care Center, Inc. v. Utah Dept. of Health, 
Div. of Health Care Financing, 751 P.2d 831 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), 
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cert, denied 765 P.2d 1278 (1988); Technomedical Labs, Inc. v. Utah 
Securities Div., 744 P.2d 320 (Ut. Ct. App. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about February 15, 1991, Defendants-Appellants GLENN B. 
SMITH, MARIANNE M. SMITH, W. GREG BUTTARS AND LESLIE E. BUTTARS 
filed Appeal #1030 with the Utah County Board of Adjustments 
(hereinafter "Board") requesting an appeal for special exceptions 
to build an airstrip for private use in Cedar Valley, Utah County. 
On March 5, 1991, the Board met to decide upon the above 
request, and after duly considering all relevant safety concerns, 
granted Appellants1 application for special exception to build an 
airstrip. (T 42, 47) The Board's trained zoning personnel 
specifically considered the existence of other airport facilities 
in proximity to the requested airstrip. (T 1-3, 6-10) (R 119-124) 
The Board concluded that granting the application would not result 
in the creation of any hazard to other aircraft or people engaged 
in flying activities in the area. 
Plaintiff-Appellee, LARRY PATTERSON, owns and operates the 
Cedar Valley Airport for commercial purposes, located near the 
proposed airport. Appellee objected to the Board's decision and 
filed a Complaint in the Fourth District Court on April 3, 1991. 
(R 14) The District Court filed a Memorandum Decision on April 20, 
1993, and reversed the Board's decision. (R 139-142) The District 
Court found that the Board acted in an "arbitrary, capricious, and 
illegal manner in granting Defendants-Appellants SMITH and BUTTARS' 
application for a special exception to the Zoning Ordinance of Utah 
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County." (R 142) 
Appellee did not have a permit to operate his airport and was 
in violation of the law at the time Appellants' application was 
approved by the Board. (R 160-162) Subsequently, Appellants' 
proposed private airstrip has been analyzed and approved by the 
Federal Aviation Administration (hereinafter "FAA") as not posing 
any hazard or safety concerns whatsoever. (R 224-228) The FAA 
specifically considered the nearby existence of the Cedar Valley 
Airport in its safety determination and concluded that Appellants' 
airport will not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of 
Appellee's airport. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Board is an administrative body which has specialized 
knowledge to make zoning decisions and such decisions should be 
given due deference by the reviewing court. The Board thoughtfully 
considered all of the relevant facts relating to Appeal #1030, 
including all pertinent safety issues presented at its March 5, 
1991, meeting. The Board's decision to approve the appeal is 
substantially supported by the transcript for the March 5, 1991, 
meeting. 
The reviewing court is only empowered to judge whether the 
Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence in the 
record, and cannot substitute its own judgment by undertaking an 
independent inquiry regarding already established facts. Since the 
record substantially supports the Board's decision, this Court 
should affirm the Board's decision. 
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Appellee did not have a valid license to operate his airport 
and was operating it illegally in violation of the law at the time 
of the Board's decision. As suchf Appellee cannot challenge the 
Board's decision and Appellee's claim for airspace is subordinate 
to Appellants' senior claim. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BOARD'S DECISION, 
AND THE BOARD'S DECISION CANNOT BE CHARACTERIZED AS ARBITRARY, 
CAPRICIOUS OR ILLEGAL UNDER THE RELEVANT ZONING ORDINANCE. 
A court reviewing the decision of a Board of Adjustment is 
required to give considerable deference to the Board's 
interpretation and application of the zoning ordinances. The 
Supreme Court of Utah has recognized this in validating the 
importance of deferring to the administrative bodies charged with 
zoning related powers. In Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp. , the Utah 
Supreme Court stated: 
We recognize, and reiterate, the proposition that courts 
of law cannot substitute their judgment in the area of 
zoning regulations for that of a city's governing body. 
Also, we are more than cognizant of the proposition that 
the governing body of a city is endowed with considerable 
latitude in determining the proper uses of property 
within its confines. 398 P.2d 27, at 29 (Utah 1965). 
The Utah Supreme Court reiterated this deference in Cottonwood 
Heights Citizens Association v. Bd. of Comm'n of Salt Lake County, 
where the Court said: 
In addressing the plaintiff's attack upon the judgment, 
there are certain rules to be considered. Due to the 
complexity of factors involved in the matter of zoning, 
as in other fields where courts review the actions of 
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that those 
charged with that responsibility (the Commission) have 
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specialized knowledge in that field. Accordingly, they 
should be allowed a comparatively wide latitude of 
discretion; and their actions endowed with a presumption 
of correctness and validity which the courts should not 
interfere with unless it is shown that there is no 
reasonable basis to justify the action taken. 593 P.2d 
133, at 141 (Utah 1979). 
From the above, it is obvious that a court reviewing a 
decision of a Board of Adjustment must give "wide latitude" to the 
discretion of that Board. While deferring to the Board's 
"specialized knowledge," the court must determine if the 
"substantial evidence" requirement of U.C.A. §17-27-708(6) is met. 
If the "substantial evidence" requirement is met, the court "shall 
affirm the decision of the Board." 
A. The Transcript of the Board's Meeting on March 5, 1991, 
to Decide Upon Appellants1 Application Contains 
Substantial Evidence to Support the Board's Decision. 
In the District Court's Memorandum Decision in this case, the 
court's two (2) principal concerns were the potential danger posed 
by the planes using the Cedar Valley Airport and the close 
proximity of Lake Mountain. A careful review of the transcript 
from the Board's meeting establishes that there is substantial 
evidence that the Board thoughtfully addressed the safety issues of 
the airstrip in making its determination that Appellants' proposal 
did not pose any safety concerns. 
The Zoning Administrator's Office of Utah County prepared and 
submitted a report to the Utah County Board of Adjustment for 
review and consideration at the meeting held on March 5, 1991, to 
act on the application of "Smith & Buttars" for a "special 
exception" to build an airport. (R 169) The report contained a 
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thorough "analysis" consisting of nine (9) numbered paragraphs, a 
section outlining all pertinent ordinances and a recommendation. 
The report also contained an aerial map and a plot plan. (R 119, 
121) 
Buck Rose, a trained planner from the Zoning Administrators 
staff found that the power lines in the area would not pose a 
safety problem for the airstrip. (T 2) Mr. Rose also stated: 
I found that the other airport was far enough away, there 
is an airport in Cedar Valley, so I do not see a conflict 
between the two. And certainly the degree of flying in 
both these airports would be very small, and this one 
[the proposed airstrip] would be very small indeed... 
(T 3) 
Mr. GLENN SMITH answered the Board's inquiries as to the 
potential danger posed by other aircraft in the airspace near the 
proposed airstrip by telling the Board that the altitude of 
aircraft in the area of the proposed airstrip approaching the Salt 
Lake City Airport, was probably "6,000 or 7,000 feet above ground 
level" (T 9), while "our pattern in operation would be less than 
1,000, but the average pattern height at that point would be about 
1,000 feet." (T 10) Mr. SMITH further noted that he, like the 
pilots of planes that fly into the Sait Lake City Airport, was 
aware of the jump site to the west of the Cedar Valley Airport and 
that his operation would be in the same valley and safer than the 
person "who is unfamiliar with the area who is just flying 
through." (T 19) 
Mrs. MARIANNE SMITH, addressing the issue of air safety with 
regard to other planes, explained that they would communicate by 
radio with other planes and probably with the proposed airstrip. 
7 
(T 20) Finally, Mr. GREG BUTTARS, confirming Mr. Rose's 
observation that there would be little traffic using the proposed 
strip, stated that there would only be about two (2) flights per 
month or possibly one (1) per week. (T 27) 
When Appellee, Mr. PATTERSON, applied to the Board for 
approval of his Cedar Valley Airport, in June of 1991, his business 
license for the airport had expired. (R 172) The Board granted 
approval for his airport, subject to the following condition: 
That the operation of Mr. Patterson's airport not 
interfere with the turning patterns or landing patterns 
of the previously approved Smith airport. (emphasis 
added) (R 154) 
As to any risk Lake Mountain might pose to the operation of 
the airstrip, Mr. Rose forewarned the Board that if they believed 
that the airstrip was unsafe, they should not vote for it. 
I believe that in your approval, you've got to consider 
the safety design of the airport. If you feel that it's 
unsafe because there's a mountain there, if safety is a 
general commission of special exceptions, in fact 7-21-C-
1. If you feel the design is unsafe regardless of this 
other issue, I believe you've got to not vote for it, but 
if you feel that it is safe, even though the mountain is 
there, then you should. (T 6) 
Mr. SMITH detailed for the Board the FAA approved and 
recommended traffic pattern which he would use at the airstrip. (T 
11-13) Mr. SMITH also demonstrated how the approved pattern would 
apply to the proposed airstrip. Id. When Mr. Carlile questioned, 
"Is there any situation where it would be necessary to be turning 
toward the mountain?" Mr. SMITH responded: 
I don't think so. I can't think of any because it's kind 
of like having one hundred and eighty degrees to work in 
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and not a narrow path or one quarter of space, which is 
not unusual in your bush type or private airstrips out on 
farms. (T 13) 
To further emphasize the importance of safety, the Board, in 
its motion to approve the special exception, prudently included the 
condition that "if any building or structure is constructed which 
intrudes in the elevations of the approach zone, turning zone or 
transition zone," approval would be rescinded. 
The above-cited references are part of the evidence contained 
in the transcript upon which the Board based its decision. This 
evidence proves that the Board1s decision was not arbitrary and 
capricious. On the contrary, the Board carefully analyzed an 
exhaustive list of possible safety concerns and found that the 
airport proposal still qualified for approval. Not only did the 
Board take into consideration all existing safety concerns, the 
Board's approval was also cognizant of prospective safety concerns 
as well, as evidenced by the stipulated condition. 
According to American Jurisprudence, "Evidence is substantial 
if a conclusion of a trier of the facts can be reasonably based 
upon it." 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning §1062. Furthermore, "substantial 
evidence" is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might 
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Johnson v. Dept. of 
Emp. Security. 782 P.2d 965 at 968 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
The Utah Code sets forth the standard of review in cases of 
this kind. 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board 
of adjustment may petition the district court for a review of 
the decision. 
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(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege that the 
Board of Adjustments decision was arbitrary, capricious, or 
illegal. 
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days 
after the Board of Adjustment's decision is final. 
(4)(a) The Board of Adjustment shall transmit to the 
reviewing court the record of its proceedings 
including its minutes, findings, orders and, if 
available, a true and correct transcript of its 
proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a 
transcript of that tape recording is a true 
and correct transcript for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(5)(a)(i) If there is a record, the district courtfs 
review is limited to the record provided by 
the board of adjustment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any 
evidence outside the Board of Adjustment's record 
unless that evidence was offered to the Board of 
Adjustment and the court determines that it was 
improperly excluded by the Board of Adjustment. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses 
and take evidence. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the Board of 
Adjustment if the decision is supported by substantial 
evidence in the record. (Utah Code Annotated, §17-27-708) 
In light of the above-cited references, the cumulative 
evidence that was presented before the Board and upon which the 
Board reasonably based its decision to approve Appeal #103 0, was 
substantial, and this Court should affirm the Board's decision. 
B. The Board's Decision is Further Validated by the FAA'S 
Approval of the Proposed Airstrip, and Cannot be 
Characterized as Arbitrary or Capricious. 
Subsequent to the Board's decision to approve Appellants' 
application, Appellants also received an approval from the FAA. (R 
150, 151) The letter clearly states that "the Federal Aviation 
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Administration (FAA) has no objection to the proposal, it will not 
adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace by 
aircraft.. ." (R 151) 
The letter specifically referred to the existing Cedar Valley 
Airport and stated that "In making this determination, the FAA has 
considered matters such as the effect the proposal would have on 
the existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports, 
the effects it would have on the existing airspace structure and 
projected programs of the FAA,..." (R 151) 
Therefore, the Board's decision can hardly be characterized as 
arbitrary or capricious since it is supported by experts in the 
field of aviation. 
POINT II 
THE REVIEWING COURT CANNOT SUBSTITUTE ITS JUDGMENT FOR THAT OF 
THE BOARD WHEN THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE 
BOARD'S DECISION 
In Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, plaintiff 
appealed a Board of Adjustment's denial of his variance. The Utah 
Supreme Court stated "that the role of the district court in 
reviewing the Board of Adjustment's decision is to determine 
whether the action was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and 
capricious." 685 P.2d 1032, at 1034-1035 (Utah 1984). The Utah 
Supreme Court also declared: 
The district court undertook to weigh anew the underlying 
factual consideration. While there may have been some 
evidence in the record to support the trial judge's 
findings, it was not his prerogative to weigh the 
evidence anew. His role was limited to determining 
whether there was evidence in the record to support the 
Board of Adjustment's action. The judge went beyond this 
role and decided the case according to his notion of what 
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was in the best interests of the citizens of Salt Lake 
City...However, it does not matter whether the judge 
agrees or disagrees with the rationale of the Board or 
the policy grounds upon which a decision is based. It 
does not lie within the prerogative of the trial court to 
substitute its judgment for that of the Board where the 
record discloses a reasonable basis for the Board's 
decision. Id. (emphasis added). 
Although the Xanthos action dealt with a city Board of 
Adjustment, the rationale is also applicable to appeals from a 
county Board of Adjustment. 
The Utah Supreme Court's rationale in Xanthos is supported by 
other authorities. Among the requirements for judicial review of 
zoning decisions enumerated by the Kansas Court of Appeals is the 
following: 
(5) A court may not substitute its judgment for that of 
the administrative body, and should not declare the 
action unreasonable unless clearly compelled to do so by 
the evidence. Martin Marietta Aggregates v. Bd. of Ctv. 
Comnf rs, 625 P.2d 516, at 525 (Kan. App. 1980). 
The Oregon Court of Appeals declared: 
Our review, then, is of the Commission's order, including 
the findings and conclusions supporting it. If those 
findings are supported by the evidence from the record on 
which the Commission relied, and the conclusions are 
supported by those findings, we may not disturb the order 
solely because we might reach a different conclusion. 
Haviland v. Land Conservation and Dev. Comm'n. 609 P.2d 
423, at 425 (Or. App. 1980). 
Finally, American Jurisprudence confirms: 
While a court reviewing a decision of a Board of Adjustment 
may not substitute its judgment for that of the board, it will 
examine the records upon which the Board's decision is based 
to determine whether the findings of the Board are supported 
by substantial evidence. 83 Am Jur 2d Zoning §1062. 
The District Court's determination that the Board acted in an 
illegal manner in violation of Utah County Ordinance §3-34 is 
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clearly a substitution of its own judgment for that of the Board. 
§3-34 reads as follows: 
It is the intent of this section to avoid or lessen 
hazards from the operation of aircraft, to avoid creation 
of new hazards, and to protect the lives of people who 
use aircraft facilities. Utah County Ordinance §3-34. 
Not only is there substantial evidence in the record to 
support the Board's decision which alone should have precluded such 
a determination by the District Court, there is clear evidence that 
the Board considered the safety issues in-depth and came to the 
reasoned conclusion that there would be no hazards from granting 
the proposed airport. As in Xanthos: 
The record in this case clearly reflects that the Board 
of Adjustment's action was not arbitrary or capricious 
and that there was a reasonable basis in evidence to 
justify it. 685 P.2d at 1035. 
As such, the Court of Appeals should confirm the Board's 
decision on the basis of substantial evidence in the record. 
POINT III 
APPELLEE DID NOT HAVE A PERMIT TO OPERATE HIS AIRPORT AND WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE LAW AT THE TIME APPELLANTS' APPEAL WAS GRANTED 
BY THE BOARD. THEREFORE, APPELLEE'S CLAIM TO AIRSPACE FOR HIS 
AIRPORT IS SUBJECT TO APPELLANTS SMITH AND BUTTARS1 CLAIM AS THEY 
WERE FIRST IN TIME TO OBTAIN APPROVAL FROM THE BOARD 
On April 23, 1991, Appellee was cited for operating Cedar 
Valley Airport without a license in violation of Utah County 
ordinance. (R 172) As a result of his non-compliance, Appellee 
was required to receive approval for his airport from the Board 
before he could obtain a new business license. (R 165) 
Appellants SMITH and BUTTARS obtained approval for their 
airstrip from the Board on March 5, 1991. The Board filed its 
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approval for Appellee's airport on June 5, 1991, three (3) months 
after Appellants. (R 154) Between the expiration of his business 
license in 1989 and the renewal of his business license in 1991, 
Appellee was operating the Cedar Valley Airport in violation of the 
law. The approval of Appellee's airport was subject to the 
following condition: "That the operation of Mr. Patterson's airport 
not interfere with the turning patterns or landing patterns of the 
previously approved Smith airport." (R 153) 
In general, a person suffering a legal wrong due to an 
administrative agency action or who is adversely affected by an 
agency action, is entitled to judicial review of the agency action. 
73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure, §190. A "legal 
wrong" means invasion of a legally protected right, due to an 
administrative agency action. Braude v. Wirtz, 350 F.2d 702, at 
706 (9th Cir. 1965). In this instance, since Appellee's license 
had already expired and he was operating his airport in violation 
of the law, he did not have any legally protectable rights at the 
time of filing his Complaint. A person "adversely affected" is one 
who has suffered some character of prejudice for which he is 
entitled to seek redress in courts. Crank v. McLaughlin, 2 3 S.E.2d 
56, at 59 (W. Va. 1942). Appellee could not have been adversely 
affected with respect to Appellants' proposed airstrip infringing 
upon any possible rights that Appellee claims he had, since he did 
not possess the legal right to operate his airport at the time in 
question. As such, Appellee did not have the proper standing to 
file a Complaint against the Board's decision. 
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Appellants SMITH and BUTTARS had first priority to airspace 
because they received Board approval before Appellee. Recognizing 
Appellants1 first-in-time claim, the Board granted approval for 
Appellee's airport, subject to the SMITH airport's flight patterns. 
In a similar manner, this Court should acknowledge that Appellants 
SMITH and BUTTARS' claim for airspace has priority over Appellee's 
claim because Appellants were first-in-time to obtain approval. 
Moreover, since Appellee was operating his airport in violation of 
the law when Appellants' appeal was granted by the Board, the Board 
did not have to consider the effect of Appellants' landing strip on 
air traffic in the area created by Appellee's illegally operated 
airport. 
POINT IV 
THE ISSUE OP "SAFETY" OF AN AIRPORT IS 
PRE-EMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW 
After receiving approval of their application for a special 
exception to construct an airstrip on their property, Appellants 
SMITH and BUTTARS received a letter from one Barbara Johnson, an 
airport planner of the Federal Aviation Administration. The 
pertinent portions of the letter read as follows: 
Based on this study, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) has no objection to the proposal. It will not 
adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace 
by aircraft provided at least one clear 20:1 approach 
slope is established and maintained and you contact an 
owner of the nearby private use Cedar Valley Airport to 
advise the owner(s) of your operation.... 
This determination does not mean FAA approval or dis-
approval of the physical development involved in the 
proposal. It is a determination with respect to the safe 
and efficient use of airspace by aircraft and with 
respect to the safety of persons and property on the 
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ground. 
In making this determination, the FAA has considered 
matters such as the effect the proposal would have on the 
existing or planned traffic patterns of neighboring 
airports, the effects it would have on the existing 
airspace structure and projected programs of the FAA, the 
effects it would have on the safety of persons and 
property on the ground, and the effects that existing or 
proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) and 
known natural objects within the affected area would have 
on the proposal. 
The Federal Aviation Act directs the Secretary of Trans-
portation to regulate the use of airspace, "in order to insure the 
safety of aircraft and the efficient utilization of such 
(navigable) airspace." 49 U.S.C. §1348(a). 
The Federal Aviation Act specifically prohibits states from 
enacting or enforcing laws relating to "rates, routes, or services 
of any air carrier...(in) interstate air transportation. 49 U.S.C. 
§1305(a) (1) . 
Appellants contend that the federal law pre-empts state or 
local law on the issue of regulation of airspace and flight 
patterns to airports. A statute may be construed as pre-emptive 
under three (3) circumstances. First, Congress, in enacting a 
federal statute, may express a clear intent to pre-empt state law. 
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation 
and Development Commission, 461 U.S. 190 (1983). Second, absent 
expressed pre-emption, federal law may have an implied pre-emptive 
effect if Congress revealed this intent by occupying the field of 
regulation. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. (1984). 
There is implied pre-emption when there is a "scheme of federal 
regulation so pervasive as to make reasonable inferences that 
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Congress left no room to supplement it" or "because the act of 
Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so 
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude 
enforcement of state laws on the same subject." Fidelity Federal 
Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. De la Ouesta, 458 U.S. 153 (1947) . There 
is a third type of pre-emption when state law actually conflicts 
with federal law. Such a conflict occurs where "compliance with 
both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility." 
Florida Lime and Avocado Growers. Inc., v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 
(1963). 
In the case of City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 
U.S. 624 (1973), the United States Supreme Court established that 
Congress1 pervasive regulation of aviation pre-empted local 
attempts to regulate aircraft noise. Lower federal court decisions 
are consistent with Burbank. See E.G. Blue Sky Entertainment, 
Inc. . v. Town of Gardener. 711 F. Supp. 678 (N.D.N.Y. 1989, Aff'd., 
621 F.2d 227) (Local ordinance regulating parachute jumping and 
attendant aircraft noise pre-empted); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater, 
711 F.2d 1006 (11th Cir. 1983) (Non-proprietor imposed curfew pre-
empted) ; United States v. City of Blue Ash, 487 F. Supp. 135 (S.D. 
Ohio, 1978) (Local ordinance prescribing aircraft flight patterns 
pre-empted). 
In this case, the Federal Aviation Association approved the 
flight pattern and approach to the private airstrip proposed to be 
constructed by SMITH and BUTTARS. The FAA considered matters such 
as the effect the proposal would have on the existing or planned 
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traffic patterns of neighboring airports, the effects it would have 
on the existing airspace structure and projected programs of the 
FAA, the effects it would have on the safety of persons and 
property on the ground, and the effects that existing or proposed 
man-made objects and known natural objects within the effected area 
would have on the proposal. The issue of safety of the airport is 
thus pre-empted by federal law. This leaves only the issue of 
whether substantial evidence existed in the record supporting the 
decision of the BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT to permit the construction of 
the physical facilities on the proposed airstrip site. This issue 
has been treated 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, Appellants respectfully 
request this Court to reverse the decision of the District Court 
and to affirm the decision of the Utah County Board of Adjustments 
allowing the Appellants1 proposed construction of their airport. 
DATED this 22nd day of March, 1994. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
GAR^J^ WEIGHT (J 
Attorney/^for Appellants Smith & 
Buttars 
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I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 22nd day 
of March, 1994, two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants 
to the following: 
George E. Brown, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 
#6 West Main Street, #B 
PO Box 346 
American Fork, UT 84003 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated, §17-27-708 
Memorandum Decision 
FAA letter 
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KAY 11391 
(303) 286-5527 urfT-ALVfcOATVAC 
C A T E 
Mr* Glenn Smith 
1001 Monte Vista Ave 
Phelanf California 82371 
Dear Mr. Smith: 
*xn+G> *TW«X 
atmAix-x^ux^c 
rt>/Tw; nr^iaou 
^ ^ ^ A - . 
An airspace analysis (91-ANM/D-026-NRA) of the proposed privare 
use Cedar Fort Airport near Cedar Fort, Utah, has be' 
completed. Based on this study, the Federal Aviatidn 
Administration (FAA) has no objection to the proposal/ it wifcr 
not adversely affect the safe and efficient use of airspace Ipy 
aircraft provided at least one clear 20:1 approach slope 
established and maintained and you contact the owner of the 
nearby private use Cedar Valley Airport to advise the owner ( S^C^ZWUOUK' 
of your operation. You may want to consider drafting a mutually 
satisfactory operating arrangement between the two airport^S ~ 
You should also be aware that the proposed runway length yf 
2600' is less than the minimum recommended 5500' runway lengr&cT*<***** 
for a group of aircraft. Please review the operational 
characteristics of your aircraft to ensure it can safely operat5£^ZI^~ 
off a 2600 ' runway at an airfield elevation of 5300'- I have 
enclosed a pamphlet on density altitude for your information an 
use. 
This determination does not mean FAA approval or disapproval <f>f 
the physical development involved in the proposal. It is 
determination with respect to the safe and efficient use 
airspace by aircraft and with respect to the safety of persof^J 
and property on the ground. 
S r t 
fCUTIMCSTUBOk. 
HOUTlAC SYWftOC 
In making this determination, the FAA has considered matters 
such as•'••tlie effect the proposal would have on the existing (pS^^ST 
planned traffic patterns of neighboring airports, the effects It 
would have on the existing airspace structure and projected 
programs of the FAA, the effects it would have on the safety <j>f 
persons and property on the ground, a:nd the effects thk^^^"" 
existing or proposed man-made objects (on file with the FAA) aid 
known natural objects within the affected area would have on ttS?SZcw»*z 
proposal. I 
tn The FAA cannot prevent: the construction of structures near 
airport. The airport environs can only be protected througE 
such means as local zoning ordinances or acquisition of property 
rights. 
FAA Form 1360-14.1 ($-33) OFFICIAL RUE COPY * U ^ G P O ; l S©0-0-768~Ci 2/20101 
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No evaluation of the environmental aspects of the proposal wf£ 
; ^v^ .KPt -c ta 
*\s.r.*CZrvZOL 
made i n r e a c h i n g t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T h e r e f o r e , t h i s 
determination i s not to be construed as approval of the p r o p o r . ^ ^ ^ ^ ; " 
from an environmental s t a n d p o i n t under Pub l i c Law 9 l - l ^ o 
(National Environmental Policy Act of 1969). CAT* 
When the airport becomes operational, please complete and retutfS^ 
the enclosed FAA Form 5010-5f Airport Master Record. If tlie 
airport does not become operational within 12 months of the dafe^o^r 
of this letter, this airspace determination will expire unless 
you request a time extension. 
If in the future you wish to open the airport to public use, 
new airspace determination will be required. In addition, 
the airport changes names, changes ownership, or the 
changes address, please notify the FAA, NFDC on Form 5010-5 * 
the FAA solicits information on the airport without respons 
the airport may be considered inactive. 
Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. If you have ai[ 
questionst please contact me at the above number. 
C A T * 
f 
o w n e x«ruu-.eou7u*t. 
T «* 
V 
tf37Ul2£&GKArwAC 
Sincerely# 
/$, 
Barbara Johnson 
Airport Planner 
Enclosure 
<DCZ 
AAS-300 w/7480-1 & sketch 
ANM-530 
State Aeronautics 
Wasatch Front COG (Dennis Coombs) 
DEN-614: BcFofcnson: meh: 5 / 1 / 9 1 : g s m i t h • e r 
a*Tt 
*D</Ttf»0 STkaOL 
turrUi^wouTUM 
wxnry»GyY*8<x 
nswTixi sruao. 
v«tf.AuretG«A?um[ 
I M I T 
foctuta XTMJA. 
i iMrrj^ruAAAruJC 
I C*Tt 
FAA Form 1360-1<U (S-S5) OFFICIAL RLE COPY +0£X&O:\ ©yvO-76* 0 i 2/7C101 
FILED IH 
4™ DISTRiCT COURT 
STATE Of UTAH 
UTAH - ":.--" 
APR Z2 I O O S M ' ^ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT <^T0 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LARRY PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
CASE NUMBER: 910400188 
vs. 
UTAH COUNTY BOARD OF MEMORANDUM DECISION 
ADJUSTMENT, etal . , 
Defendants. 
This case comes before the Court on appeal from a decision of the Utah County 
Board of Adjustment pursuant to § 17-27-708 U.C.A.. Because a transcript of the 
proceedings before the Board of Adjustment exists and has been provided to the Court, the 
Court's review is limited to the record and a hearing in this matter is unnecessary. § 17-27-
708(5)(a) U.C.A. After full consideration of the record, including the aforementioned 
transcript and plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgement, the 
Court hereby reverses the decision of the Board of Adjustment. The Court finds that the 
Board acted in an arbitrary, capricious and illegal manner in granting defendants Smith and 
Buttars' application for a special exception to the zoning ordinances of Utah County. 
First, the Court notes that while plaintiff appears to have standing to bring this action 
in that he is an individual "aggrieved" by the Board's decision, he did not attend the hearing 
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of this matter before the Board. As a result, his factual allegations and protests are not part 
of the record for purposes of the present plenary review. Further, while plaintiff complains 
that he was given no personal notice of the hearing, he does not contend that the board failed 
to give public notice as is statutorily required. Therefore, the Court cannot find that 
plaintiffs due process right to notification has been violated, and the Court must therefore 
limit its review to those facts contained in the record. 
Nevertheless, the evidence contained in the record is sufficient to establish that the 
Board acted arbitrarily, capriciously and illegally in approving the private airport at issue. It 
is clear from the transcript of the Board's proceedings that the proposed air strip would be 
located on the east side of Cedar Valley, "against" the west slope of Lake Mountain 
(Transcript at 1), making aircraft approach from the East impossible. It is also clear from 
the record that the proposed airstrip would be within two miles of the existing Cedar Valley 
Airport. (Transcript at 21). The placement of the airstrip at the proposed location would 
not allow for an adequate turning radius (two miles) as defined under section 3-34 of the 
Utah County Zoning Ordinance. Given the close proximity of the mountain and the 
possibility of overlapping and converging flight patterns with aircraft utilizing the nearby 
Cedar Valley Airport, the Court must find that the Board violated section 3-34, and that it 
acted arbitrarily in finding that the proposed airstrip would promote public health, safety, and 
welfare. The Court finds that the location of the proposed airstrip presents an inherently 
unsafe situation in contravention of the intent of the Zoning Ordinance: 
It is the intent of this section to avoid or lessen hazards resulting from the operation 
of aircraft, to avoid creation of new hazards, and to protect the lives of people who 
use aircraft facilities. 
Utah County Zoning Ordinance § 3-34. 
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In making the present ruling, the Court denies defendants Smith and Buttars' Motion 
to Dismiss. Because this case impacts on public safety, rather than the mere interests of the 
parties, the Court cannot approve or accept the parties' alleged stipulation purporting to 
resolve this case by way of compromise. The Court will simply not allow the safety of the 
public to be compromised in the way that the parties have suggested. 
The Court also denies Utah County's motion to dismiss, finding it to be without 
merit. The Court finds that the reasons set forth in plaintiffs Response in Opposition to 
Motion to Dismiss constitute "good cause" for failure to file a certificate of readiness within 
180 days as required under Rule 4-103(2) of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
Furthermore, it is evident from plaintiff's pleadings that the present action is in the form of 
an appeal seeking plenary review of a decision of the Utah County Board of Adjustment 
pursuant to § 7-24 of the zoning ordinance. Accordingly, as defendant should be well aware, 
the undertaking and notice requirements cited by defendant are inapplicable, and the 
plaintiff's action is in no way barred by principles of governmental immunity. 
Finally, the Court finds that plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgement is moot and 
inappropriate in that the Court's plenary review pursuant to § 17-27-708 U.C.A. has required 
full consideration of the evidence presented to the Board. 
Counsel for plaintiff is to prepare an order within 15 days of this decision consistent 
with the terms of this memorandum and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. This memorandum decision has no 
effect until such order is signed by the Court. 
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Dated this 20th day of April, 1993. 
cc: George E. Brown, Jr., Esq. 
Mark Brady, Esq. 
Gary H. Weight, Esq. 
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COUNTY LAND USE DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT 17-27-801 
17-27-708. District court review of board of adjustment de-
cision [Effective July 1, 1992]. 
(1) Any person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment 
may petition the district court for a review of the decision. 
(2) In the petition, the plaintiff may only allege tha t the board of adjust-
ment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal. 
(3) The petition is barred unless it is filed within 30 days after the board of 
adjustment's decision is final. 
(4) (a) The board of adjustment shall t ransmit to the reviewing court the 
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if 
available, a t rue and correct transcript of its proceedings. 
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of tha t tape record-
ing is a t rue and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection. 
(5) (a) (i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the 
record provided by the board of adjustment. 
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the 
board of adjustment's record unless tha t evidence was offered to the 
board of adjustment and the court determines tha t it was improperly 
excluded by the board of adjustment. 
(b) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence. 
(6) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the 
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. 
(7) (a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the board of 
adjustment. 
(b) (i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party may petition the 
board of adjustment to stay its decision. 
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may 
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of 
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the county. 
(iii) After the petition is filed the petitioner may seek an injunc-
tion staying the board of adjustment's decision. 
History: C. 1953, 17-27-708, enacted by L. Effective Dates. — Laws 1991, ch. 235, 
1991, ch. 235, § 93. § 110 makes the act effective on July 1, 1992. 
